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State and Local Anti-Predatory Lending Laws:   
The Effect of Legal Enforcement Mechanisms 
 
Abstract 
 
Subprime mortgage lending has grown rapidly in recent years and with it, so have 
concerns about predatory lending.  In response to evidence of predatory lending, most 
states have enacted new laws or expanded existing laws to address abuses in the subprime 
home loan market. The effect of these statutes is a matter of debate.  This paper seeks to 
improve the understanding of this increasingly important issue and pays particular 
attention to the role that legal enforcement mechanisms play in this context.  The results 
of the analysis are consistent with the view that anti-predatory lending laws influence 
subprime lending markets and that disaggregating the details of the overall legal 
framework into its component parts is essential for understanding subprime market 
dynamics.  The restrictions, coverage, and enforcement components all have significant 
relationships with subprime market outcomes, with the coverage relationship found to be 
broadly consistent with the reverse lemons hypothesis put forward by Ho and 
Pennington-Cross (2007).  The results also suggest that the newer mini-HOEPA laws 
have had an impact on the subprime market above and beyond the older preexisting laws, 
particularly for subprime originations.  Broader coverage through these new laws is 
associated with higher origination likelihoods, while increased restrictions through the 
mini-HOEPA laws are associated with lower origination propensities.  
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1.  Introduction  
 
Subprime mortgage lending1 has grown rapidly in recent years2 and with it, so have 
concerns about predatory lending.3  By extending credit to borrowers who were 
historically excluded from the credit markets, subprime loans can be welfare enhancing; 
however, abusive subprime lending has the opposite effect and can actually reduce the 
welfare benefits that arise when borrowers have increased access to credit. 
 
In response to evidence of predatory lending, most states and the federal government 
have enacted new laws or expanded existing laws to address abuses in the subprime home 
loan market.4  The federal law, the federal Home Ownership Equity Protection Act 
(HOEPA) was enacted in 1994.  Since then, a growing number of states have enacted 
mini-HOEPA statutes to counteract predatory lending.  Today, well over half the states 
have anti-predatory lending statutes of one kind or another.5  These laws vary in terms of 
the loans they cover, the practices they prohibit, and the methods of enforcement they 
permit.  Other states have laws that regulate a more limited set of lending practices 
associated with predatory lending, such as prepayment penalties.   
 
The effect of these statutes is a matter of debate.  Critics charge that anti-predatory 
lending statutes reduce the availability of credit to borrowers who previously were credit-
constrained, including lower-income households and people of color, by rationing credit 
and increasing the price of subprime loans.  Supporters of these statutes argue that 
regulation is needed, both to allay consumer fears about dishonest lenders and to ensure 
that creditors internalize the cost of any negative externalities resulting from predatory 
loans.6  Concerns about these costs have increased recently with the rapid performance 
deterioration of subprime loans.7   
  
The great variety of approaches taken by individual states to regulate lending -- in 
terms of the loans they cover, the restrictions they impose, and the enforcement 
mechanisms they establish -- permits the testing of the influence of various approaches 
on the flow and cost of credit.  Prior studies of the impact of these laws have yielded 
mixed results.  There are also questions about the accuracy of their findings and the 
generalizations that can be drawn from them.  This paper seeks to address some of the 
weaknesses in these earlier studies in order to produce sharper results that improve the 
understanding of this increasingly important issue.  In particular, this study considers a 
broader set of statutes than prior research, which allows for a more comprehensive, and 
more accurate, characterization of the legal environment.  Moreover, this study takes into 
account enforcement mechanisms of anti-predatory lending laws that have not previously 
been examined in any detail, and thus broadens and deepens our understanding of the 
effects of government enforcement, private rights of action, and assignee liability 
provisions. 
 
The basic hypothesis of this paper is that law design matters and that consumers and 
lenders may react in unanticipated ways.  While laws can obviously decrease the demand 
and supply of subprime or high cost funds to homeowners and homebuyers, they can 
increase them as well.  For example, from an institution’s perspective, the introduction of 
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a law can reduce legal uncertainty thereby making lending less risky and counteracting 
reductions associated with restrictions and legal enforcement mechanisms designed to 
reduce the flow of subprime credit.  From the consumer perspective, as proposed by Ho 
& Pennington-Cross (2007), some borrowers may be deterred because they fear being 
taken advantage of.  This can work in a similar fashion as a lemons market.  The 
introduction of a predatory lending law may reduce the fear of predation and actually 
stimulate demand for subprime lending.  
 
The results of the analysis are consistent with the view that anti-predatory lending 
laws influence subprime lending markets and that disaggregating the details of the overall 
legal framework into its component parts is essential for understanding subprime market 
dynamics.  The restrictions, coverage, and enforcement components all have significant 
relationships with subprime market outcomes, with the coverage relationship found to be 
broadly consistent with the reverse lemons hypothesis put forward by Ho and 
Pennington-Cross (2007).  The results also suggest that the newer mini-HOEPA laws 
have had an impact on the subprime market above and beyond the older preexisting laws, 
particularly for subprime originations.  Broader coverage through these new laws is 
associated with higher origination likelihoods, while increased restrictions through the 
new laws are associated with lower origination propensities.  
 
This paper unfolds as follows.  Part II provides a brief history of anti-predatory 
lending laws applying to residential mortgages.  Part III reviews the empirical studies to 
date on the effect of state and local anti-predatory lending laws on residential mortgage 
credit.  Part IV describes the dataset and the design of the study, and sets forth the results.  
Part V offers conclusions. 
 
2.  A Brief Sketch Of Anti-Predatory Lending Laws 
 
Since ancient Babylonia, governments have sought to regulate abusive loans.  In the 
United States, states have regulated interest rates on loans since the signing of the 
Constitution.8    
 
Anti-predatory lending laws differ from traditional usury laws by focusing on 
practices and loan terms beyond interest rates.  While many view state anti-predatory 
lending laws as a recent development, some states have regulated non-interest loan terms 
such as prepayment penalties and balloon clauses for decades.  In some states, these 
restrictions are found in state usury statutes; in other states, they are found in local 
versions of the Uniform Consumer Commercial Code.9   Among jurisdictions with older 
laws, Alabama, Alaska, California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Iowa, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, Utah, and Wyoming have individual restrictions on prepayment 
penalties; Maine restricts balloon clauses; and Maryland has restrictions on both.   
 
In 1994, the U.S. Congress enacted the first modern, comprehensive anti-predatory 
lending statute, the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA).  HOEPA 
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regulates only the costliest subprime loans, termed “high-cost loans,” which are defined 
as loans exceeding one of the following two triggers: 
 
 the annual percentage rate (APR) at consummation exceeds the yield on 
Treasury securities of comparable maturity plus eight percent for first-lien 
loans or ten percent for subordinate-lien loans; or 
 
 the total points and fees exceed eight percent of the total loan amount or $400 
(subject to annual indexing), whichever is greater.10 
 
HOEPA covers no more than five percent of subprime residential mortgages and 
likely less.11  For that narrow set of loans, HOEPA imposes a number of substantive 
restrictions on lending terms and practices, including limitations on balloon terms, 
negative amortization, advance payments, increased interest after default, rebates, 
prepayment penalties, due-on-demand clauses, payments to home improvement 
contractors, loans made without regard to ability to repay, and loan flipping.12  Lenders 
must also make specialized, advance disclosures to borrowers receiving HOEPA loans.  
HOEPA imposes liability for violations on lenders and assignees of HOEPA loans.13  
 
In the late 1990s, many states also began adopting legislation to redress predatory 
lending.  Some of these state laws were patterned on older laws that pre-dated HOEPA.  
For example, laws enacted during this time period by Colorado, Louisiana, Nebraska, and 
Vermont restricted prepayment penalties or balloon payments on some loans (Nebraska 
not terribly effectively) with low triggers or none at all.  Vermont, Michigan, and 
Tennessee adopted new disclosure statutes. Other states, including New York and 
Massachusetts, initially addressed predatory lending through banking department 
regulations that authorized agency sanctions but not private lawsuits by aggrieved 
borrowers.  Mississippi banned asset-based loans and capped fees to mortgage brokers.  
Kansas instituted additional loan restrictions, only some of which were subject to 
triggers, and indexed the triggers to interest rates on conventional mortgages, rather than 
on Treasury securities.  Numerous states also adopted mortgage broker and banker 
licensing and regulation laws. 
 
Starting in 1999, states began taking a different tack by enacting statutes patterned 
directly on HOEPA.  North Carolina, the first state to adopt a true state “mini-HOEPA” 
law, passed its statute in 1999. The North Carolina statute took effect in two stages, with 
most restrictions becoming effective at stage 2.  The statute is described in Table 1.  
Essentially, North Carolina used the same HOEPA APR trigger but a lower points and 
fee trigger and expanded HOEPA’s substantive protections. In short order, the North 
Carolina’s mini-HOEPA law inspired other states to enact mini-HOEPA laws of their 
own, which generally operate in addition to the other state laws mentioned above.  As of 
January 1, 2007, twenty-nine states and the District of Columbus had mini-HOEPA 
statutes in effect (Table 2).  
 
The state mini-HOEPA laws display considerable variation.  With respect to 
coverage, some states, such as Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, and Nevada, use the same 
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numerical triggers as HOEPA.  Most state mini-HOEPA laws, however, lower one or 
both of the HOEPA triggers.  Restrictions also vary widely among the states, with some 
states imposing scant restrictions and others imposing heavier ones.  Finally, the 
enforcement provisions in state mini-HOEPA laws vary considerably.  Some laws only 
provide for government enforcement, while others afford injured borrowers the right to 
sue.  Some laws authorize assignee liability, while others restrict private lawsuits to loan 
originators and assignees that do not qualify as holders-in-due course.  Some laws 
authorize double or treble damages; others cap monetary relief in private lawsuits at 
compensatory damages only.14 
 
 Many of the states that adopted mini-HOEPA laws layered them on top of older 
restrictions on predatory lending that are still in effect.  Eleven states augmented their old 
prepayment penalty laws with new mini-HOEPA laws; two more states grafted their 
mini-HOEPA laws onto older laws regulating other loan practices.   Maryland’s version 
of the layer-cake phenomenon is the most complex:  its mini-HOEPA law stands side-by-
side with five older Maryland anti-predatory lending provisions.  In all of these cases, the 
new mini-HOEPA statutes supplement, rather than supplant, the older state laws.   
 
In sum, by January 1, 2007, only six states – Arizona, Delaware, Montana, North 
Dakota, Oregon, and South Dakota -- had no mini-HOEPA statutes or other older laws or 
regulations in effect restricting prepayment penalties, balloon clauses, or mandatory 
arbitration clauses in residential mortgages.   
 
Federal law has preempted portions of these state laws at various times for certain 
types of lenders and loan products.  The federal Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity 
Act (AMTPA) preempts balloon clause restrictions for all mortgages by non-depository 
lenders except for traditional fixed-rate, fully amortizing mortgages.  AMTPA applies to 
all states except states that opted out of its restrictions.15  The Home Owners’ Loan Act 
preempts state anti-predatory lending laws for federal savings associations and their 
subsidiaries.16  Finally, effective February 12, 2004, the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (O.C.C.) preempted state anti-predatory lending laws for national banks and 
their operating subsidiaries.17  Some states, such as Georgia, also have state “wild card” 
laws that waive their anti-predatory lending laws for state-chartered banks and thrifts and 
their subsidiaries to the same extent that federal preemption shields national banks and 
federal thrifts from those state laws.18   
 
3.  Literature Review 
 
Although some states have regulated practices associated with predatory lending for 
decades, until recently there were no studies evaluating the effects of state and local anti-
predatory lending laws (other than caps on interest rates) on credit flows and loan prices.  
That changed with the passage of North Carolina’s anti-predatory lending law in 1999.  
Since then, a number of studies have examined the effect of state mini-HOEPA laws on 
an assortment of outcomes.  Many of these studies consist of event studies of one 
jurisdiction’s law; others analyze outcomes nationally. 
 
8/7/2007 6 
3.1  Event Studies Of Individual State Or Local Laws 
 
3.1.1  The North Carolina Law 
 
The first studies looking at state and local anti-predatory lending laws consisted of 
event studies of the North Carolina law.  Most of these studies examined the law’s effect 
on the flow of credit.  All agreed that subprime originations fell disproportionately in 
North Carolina after passage of the law, but there is sharp disagreement as to why.  Other 
studies examined whether the dip in subprime loans in North Carolina after passage of its 
anti-predatory lending law was due to a reduction in supply or in demand.  Finally, a pair 
of studies analyzed whether the North Carolina law targeted predatory loan terms without 
impairing legitimate credit.   
 
Early studies of the North Carolina law used simple statistics to draw inferences.  
Ernst, Farris and Stein (2002) used Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data to 
compare subprime lending in North Carolina in 1999 and 2000 with subprime lending in 
the rest of the country.  The authors found that total subprime originations fell in North 
Carolina in 2000, compared with other states.  The study reported, however, that North 
Carolina had 15 percent more subprime home loans per capita than the national average 
in 2000 and that lower-income borrowers in North Carolina received a higher proportion 
of subprime to prime loans in 2000 than lower-income borrowers in any other state.   
 
Another study focused on credit flows by surveying the rate sheets of several large 
subprime lenders who were active in North Carolina before and after enactment of the 
law (Inside B&C Lending, 2001).  The researchers found that the lenders offered a full 
menu of loan products with little or no effect on loan prices despite the changes in the 
law.   
 
Elliehausen and Staten (2004) conducted a multivariate regression study to compare 
the volume of subprime mortgage originations in North Carolina with that in South 
Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia before and after passage of the North Carolina law.  
The authors used a proprietary dataset with data on all closed-end subprime residential 
mortgages originated between June 1, 1997 and June 30, 2000 by nine major lenders who 
belonged to the American Financial Services Association.19  Although the dataset had 
loan-level credit (FICO) scores, the regression analysis did not use that data.  Instead, the 
study controlled for borrower characteristics at the county level (including income, debt 
burdens, average house values, age cohorts, and length of delinquencies), plus the price 
of debt and passage of the North Carolina law.  The study found that the volume of 
subprime mortgages originated in North Carolina counties dropped about 14 percent, 
relative to other counties in the control states, after passage of the state law.  In relative 
terms post-law, subprime originations dropped for North Carolina borrowers with annual 
household incomes of $50,000 or less, but rose for higher-income borrowers in that state. 
 
There are several substantive issues with the Elliehausen and Staten study.  First, a 
small number of lenders were surveyed.  Second, the time-period examined ended before 
the law went fully into effect.20 Third, the model assumed that the control states had no 
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anti-predatory lending provisions in effect.  During all or part of the time-period studied, 
however, two of the control states – South Carolina and Virginia – had limits on 
prepayment penalties in residential mortgages.21  In addition, AMTPA preempted at least 
two of the North Carolina provisions that did go into effect during the time-period studied 
– the ban on balloon clauses in closed-end home loans and on prepayment penalties in 
personal home loans under $150,000 – in all mortgages by non-depository lenders except 
for traditional fixed-rate, fully amortizing mortgages.  Unlike North Carolina, however, 
South Carolina had opted out of AMTPA preemption.  Thus, South Carolina was 
arguably more restrictive than North Carolina with respect to prepayment penalties 
during the time-period studied. 
 
Two other studies looked at whether the reduction in North Carolina subprime loans 
post-law was due to supply-side or demand-side effects.  A report by Burnett, Finkel and 
Kaul (2004), which used HMDA data and cross-tabulations, found that loan originations 
fell in North Carolina relative to South Carolina and Tennessee after passage of the law.  
The North Carolina decline was due to relative drops in application volumes; denial rates 
were lower in North Carolina than in the control states post-law.22 
 
Similarly, using multivariate regression, Harvey and Nigro (2004) analyzed HMDA 
data before and after passage of the North Carolina law in July 1999 to determine the 
law’s effect on home mortgage applications, originations, and denials.  Georgia, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia served as the control states.  The authors treated all 
residential mortgage applications processed by lenders on the annual subprime lender list 
compiled by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) through 2000 as 
subprime loan applications.23   
 
Harvey and Nigro found that the probability of subprime loan applications and 
originations fell in North Carolina post-passage, but the probability of subprime loan 
denials did not, relative to the control states.  Thus, they attributed the falloff in North 
Carolina originations to reduced demand, not supply.  Contrary to Elliehausen and Staten, 
they reported that the law had no differential effect on North Carolina borrowers with 
household incomes of $25,000 or less.  Similarly, subprime lending by bank lenders held 
steady in North Carolina following adoption of the law, while subprime lending by 
nonbank lenders fell there, in comparison with the control states.  Finally, the market 
share of subprime loans fell in North Carolina after passage, compared with the control 
states.  Similar to the Elliehausen-Staten study, the Harvey-Nigro study stopped before 
the North Carolina law took full effect, assumed that the control states did not regulate 
predatory lending in any way, and did not account for AMTPA preemption of parts of the 
North Carolina law.  
   
A last group of studies examined whether the North Carolina law had struck a balance 
between curtailing abusive loans and ensuring the availability of credit to subprime 
borrowers.  Ernst, Farris and Stein (2002) estimated that the North Carolina law saved 
North Carolina borrowers $100 million by deterring predatory loan practices.  Quercia, 
Stegman and Davis (2004) refined this analysis by using cross-tabulations on loan-level 
Loan Performance data of securitized subprime loans to determine whether the North 
8/7/2007 8 
Carolina law was well-tailored.  The study improved upon its predecessors by comparing 
subprime lending patterns before initial implementation of the North Carolina law on 
October 1, 1999 and after full implementation on July 1, 2000.  As did most of the other 
studies, Quercia et al. assumed that none of the southern control states had anti-predatory 
lending measures in place. The authors confirmed that overall subprime originations 
dropped in North Carolina following enactment, while subprime originations elsewhere 
increased. They found, however, that the North Carolina falloff was confined to the 
refinance market, where loan flipping abuses can occur.  In contrast, subprime home 
purchase originations in that state grew as fast as or faster than in some nearby states and 
the U.S. generally.  Almost ninety percent of the reduction in subprime mortgages in 
North Carolina post-law consisted of subprime loans with at least one predatory feature.24  
In the opinion of the authors, “the NC Act [was] doing what it [was] supposed to do.”25   
 
3.1.2  Other Studies Of Local Jurisdictions 
 
Two event studies considered the effect of state or local anti-predatory lending laws 
in jurisdictions other than North Carolina.  Harvey (2003) studied HMDA data to 
ascertain the effect of anti-predatory lending ordinances adopted by Chicago and 
Philadelphia on subprime originations, applications, and denials.  The Philadelphia 
ordinance was a local mini-HOEPA law; in contrast, the Chicago law barred the city 
from doing business with depositories or contractors who made high-cost loans that 
contained predatory terms.  For Chicago, multivariate regression analysis showed that the 
likelihood of subprime loan denials and of nonbank originations of prime loans was no 
different in Chicago post-law than in the rest of Illinois.  In contrast, after enactment of 
the ordinance, the likelihood of subprime originations generally and by nonbanks in 
particular was greater in Chicago than in the rest of Illinois.  Among other things, this 
suggests that subprime lending migrated from banks to nonbanks after passage of the law.  
No conclusions can be drawn from the Philadelphia results because the study did not 
examine data during the brief time-period when the Philadelphia ordinance was in 
effect.26  
 
In an industry-commissioned study of the New Jersey law, DeMong (2004) surveyed 
14 subprime lenders and 84 mortgage brokers in New Jersey.  The respondents said that 
the dollar volume of subprime cash-out refinance loans unique to New Jersey dropped 
57.7 percent between the two months immediately preceding the New Jersey law’s 
implementation and the two months immediately afterward.  Over the same time period, 
the respondents said that the dollar volume of subprime home improvement loans unique 
to New Jersey dropped 73.2 percent.  The survey did not examine actual loan-level data 
or control for borrower characteristics or macroeconomic factors.27 
 
3.2  Nationwide Studies Of State Anti-Predatory Lending Laws 
 
With the growth in state mini-HOEPA laws, more recent studies have examined the 
effects of the state and local laws on a national scope.  An early study by Morgan Stanley 
(2002), for example, surveyed subprime branch managers and mortgage brokers across 
the country.  The investment bank reported that growth forecasts by respondents in 
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“tough” states were not significantly different from growth forecasts by respondents in 
“easy” states.  The report observed, “One of the consistent messages we heard from our 
respondents was that the increased level of disclosures was boosting consumer comfort 
levels with subprime products and thus providing a positive impact on loan volume.”28 
 
Li and Ernst (2006) used the Loan Performance database of subprime securitized 
loans to analyze the effect of state laws from January 1998 through December 2004.  The 
study ranked state laws according to the type of loans covered, points-and-fee triggers, 
substantive legal protections, and remedies available to borrowers.  The authors 
concluded that state anti-predatory lending laws reduced the prevalence of predatory loan 
terms, without reducing subprime loan originations (except in Georgia and New 
Jersey),29 compared with unregulated states.  In addition, nominal interest rates on 
mortgages stayed level or dropped in all states with anti-predatory lending laws except 
Georgia and Virginia,30 compared with the controls. 
 
Using HMDA data, Ho and Pennington-Cross (2006b) constructed a legal index to 
examine the effect of state anti-predatory lending laws on the probability of subprime 
applications, originations, and rejections.  They focused on border counties of adjacent 
states with and without anti-predatory lending laws, rather than entire states, to help hold 
labor and housing markets constant.31  Having a state anti-predatory lending law had no 
effect on the probability of origination and only a scant negative effect on the probability 
of applications, while it reduced the likelihood of being rejected.  Stronger restrictions 
reduced the likelihood of origination and applications, but had no effect on the likelihood 
of rejection.  Conversely, stronger coverage increased the likelihood of origination and 
applications without affecting the likelihood of rejection, suggesting that anti-predatory 
lending laws with lower triggers boost demand by reducing consumer fears about abusive 
lenders.   
 
Ho and Pennington-Cross (2006a) used the same legal index and border area 
methodology to examine the effect of state anti-predatory lending laws on the cost of 
credit.  Using HMDA data from 2004, they discovered that subprime loans originated in 
locations with anti-predatory lending laws had lower APRs than loans in unregulated 
states.  They also found that increasing the strength of a law had the same effect.  In both 
cases, greater coverage rather than stronger loan restrictions explained the lower APRs in 
regulated states.  A comparable analysis using Loan Performance data from 1998 through 
2005 yielded somewhat different results.  State anti-predatory lending laws modestly 
increased nominal interest rates on fixed-rate loans, but lowered them on adjustable-rate 
loans.  For both types of loans, laws with more restrictions displayed the same or higher 
spreads, while laws with greater coverage displayed lower spreads. 
 
A national study by Elliehausen, Staten and Steinbuks (2006) used a proprietary 
database of subprime loans originated by eight large lenders from 1999 through 2004, 
covering about 22 percent of high-priced residential mortgages.  The dataset contained 
loan-level information on APRs and points and fees, which helped the authors to 
distinguish loans covered by state mini-HOEPA laws from loans that were not.  
Approximately 80 to 90 percent of the mortgages in the database were refinance loans.   
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The study used three approaches to examine the effect of state laws on subprime 
originations.  In the first approach, the authors modeled the presence or absence of a state 
law as a binary variable and found that the presence of a law was associated with a 
decrease in total subprime mortgages, including both the high-cost and non-high-cost 
variety.  The second approach ran the same analysis with the combined legal index 
developed by Ho and Pennington-Cross and reached the same result.  The third approach 
consisted of an event study that used pre-law observations to predict the number of 
expected subprime originations for the post-law period.  The state-by-state results were 
randomly distributed.  Six of the states with strong laws (by our estimation)32 had 
weaker-than-expected originations and the other five had originations that were stronger-
than-expected or level.  The authors interpreted these findings as evidence that lenders 
shifted lending from covered high-cost loans to uncovered loans in response to the 
enactment of state mini-HOEPA statutes.  It is not clear from the study, however, what 
role coverage played versus restrictions.  Similarly, it is not clear whether any decrease in 
originations was due to a reduction in demand, in supply, or in both.   
 
4.  Taking A Deeper Dive: Our Study Of The Impact Of State Anti-Predatory 
Lending Laws 
 
This study builds on the prior literature by conducting a national examination of the 
impact of all anti-predatory lending laws, not just mini-HOEPA laws, on subprime 
mortgage markets.  Following Harvey and Nigro (2004) and Ho and Pennington-Cross 
(2006), and given our interest in the effects of these laws on both applicants and lenders, 
we focus on three outcomes – (1) the probability of applying for a subprime loan relative 
to a prime loan, (2) the probability of originating a subprime loan relative to a prime loan, 
and (3) the probability of a subprime application being rejected.  We relate these 
outcomes to various borrower and locational characteristics as well as to the anti-
predatory law environment in which the borrower and lender made their decisions for 
calendar years 2004 and 2005.   
 
Our study distinguishes itself from its predecessors in several respects.  Most 
significantly, it reflects a new and more comprehensive canvassing of primary legal 
sources to paint a complete picture of the landscape regarding anti-predatory lending 
laws.  This new collection effort has highlighted 16 additional states that have anti-
predatory lending laws that were not identified in prior studies that used surveys of state 
laws compiled by law firms or trade associations.33  Thus our study considers 41 states 
(including Washington DC) while others considered at most 25. In addition, we study the 
incremental effect of layering a modern mini-HOEPA law on top of an older-style law 
that addresses only one or a few loan terms. 
 
This new collection effort allows this study to make two advances.  First, it permits 
one to distinguish between the older laws and the new mini-HOEPA laws in terms of 
incidence and effect.  The data can be partitioned such that we can characterize states 
according to the independent presence of older style and newer mini-HOEPA laws.  This 
permits the creation of two separate indexes and the determination of whether the mini-
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HOEPA laws had an effect above and beyond the older laws already on the books in 
many states.  
 
Second, this new collection effort has resulted in a dataset that permits an 
examination of the effects of various enforcement mechanisms established by the laws, 
which was previously not possible.  We therefore are able to assess whether legal 
enforcement mechanisms matter for individual and lender behavior.  Among other things, 
the new data allow us to control for the presence and strength of assignee liability 
provisions in state anti-predatory lending laws, which is critical because over eighty 
percent of subprime home mortgages have been securitized in recent years.34  Assignee 
liability laws are ones that allow borrowers to sue (or at least raise defenses against) 
investors who have bought their loans. 
 
In other respects, this research builds upon prior studies.  Like other projects, we use 
HMDA data, which provides the broadest coverage and enables us to examine most 
residential mortgage lending nationwide.  The advent of HMDA pricing data in 2004 
permits us to distinguish prime from subprime loans with greater accuracy than studies 
using HMDA data for years before 2004.  We thus limit our focus to 2004 and 2005 to 
capitalize on this enhanced measure.   
 
We use two methods to identify subprime loans.  First, as in the prior literature, we 
use a list of subprime lenders generated by HUD through industry trade publications, 
HMDA data analysis, and phone calls to confirm the extent of subprime lending.35 
Second, we define loans reported by HMDA as having an APR/comparable Treasury 
yield spread of 3 percentage points (300 basis points) or higher as being subprime loans.  
Unfortunately, the spread is only reported on originated loans so we cannot directly 
examine the demand for loans through the application function.  For observations in 
2004, all empirical tests are repeated using either the HUD list definition for subprime 
loans (denoted as “List” in the tables) or the HMDA pricing rule to define subprime loans 
(denoted as “Price” in the tables).  For loans originated in 2005, the HUD list was not yet 
available, so we report results only for originations, using the HMDA pricing rule alone. 
 
While we model the presence of a law as a binary variable, as do other studies, we 
also consider how the strength, coverage, and enforcement mechanisms of state anti-
predatory lending laws influence market outcomes. In addition, because the treatment of 
effective dates has been an issue in earlier studies, we establish an explicit approach that 
excludes any jurisdiction whose mortgage lending laws changed in any material respect 
during the calendar year.  Finally, we control for borrower and location characteristics 
such as unemployment rates, housing vacancies, population growth, and income. 
 
The following subsections provide more detail regarding our empirical work.  
Because of its importance for the current study, the data collection effort and the creation 
of our new index for state-level anti-predatory lending laws is discussed in detail below.  
We then discuss the identification strategy for determining the effect of anti-predatory 
lending laws.  Following this is a discussion of the empirical model and then the 
empirical results.   
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4.1  Description Of The Data 
 
4.1.1  Legal Dataset And Index 
 
We created a legal index that refines and builds on an index previously created by Ho 
and Pennington-Cross (2006a).  The Ho and Pennington-Cross index coded state and 
municipal laws along two dimensions: coverage and restrictions, each of which contained 
four measures.  In creating their index, Ho and Pennington-Cross relied on a chart of anti-
predatory lending laws produced by a private law firm.   
 
Like Ho and Pennington-Cross, our legal index contains four coverage and four 
restriction measures.  Our study differs, however, in several respects.  First, we analyzed 
the actual statutes governing lending in every state to identify anti-predatory lending 
provisions and did not limit ourselves to mini-HOEPA laws.  Second, our index includes 
a third dimension – enforcement – that has two components:  assignee liability and 
enforcement methods against originators.  Lastly, through our legal expertise, we were 
able to detect subtleties in the laws that led to a more refined index and more accurate 
coding of the laws.  Table 3 fully describes the parameters of the index. 
 
In measuring the breadth of a law’s coverage, we take into account the types of loans 
that are covered by the law and any annual percentage rate (APR) and points and fee 
thresholds that trigger application of the law.  Laws that are HOEPA-equivalents in terms 
of coverage are scored 0.  Laws that govern all loans or that have no triggers receive the 
highest scores on the index.   
 
The first measure in the coverage index is the type of loan covered by the law.   Laws 
that apply to more loan types receive a higher score.  For example, if a law does not cover 
Federal Housing Administration or Veteran’s Administration loans, it is scored 1.  In 
contrast, laws that apply to all types of loans receive a score of 4.  The APR and points 
and fees measures are graduated with HOEPA serving as the floor.  Thus, HOEPA 
equivalents are scored 0 and laws without triggers receive the highest possible scores.   
Those laws with triggers lower than HOEPA’s are assigned intermediate scores based on 
where they fall relative to HOEPA. 
 
The restrictions measure considers four features of anti-predatory lending laws: limits 
on prepayment penalties, restrictions on balloon payments, requirements for credit 
counseling or notice of the availability of such counseling, and restrictions on loan terms 
that limit or bar borrowers’ access to the courts.  As with the coverage measures, the laws 
that impose the strongest restrictions receive the highest number of points on the 
restrictions index.  A ban, for example, on prepayment penalties would code a 4 while a 
law that was silent on prepayment penalties would be a 0, with gradations between based 
on the timing of bans on prepayment penalties.  A similar scale holds for limits on 
balloon payments.   
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Laws that require borrowers to obtain credit counseling before closing on their loans 
are assigned the highest number, which is 2 for this measure.  Those laws that only 
recommend counseling or that only require that borrowers be given notice of the right to 
or the value of credit counseling receive a 1, whereas laws that neither recommend nor 
require counseling are assigned a 0.  Some jurisdictions prohibit loan terms that require 
borrowers to submit any disputes arising from their loans to arbitration or that otherwise 
restrict borrowers’ access to the courts.  Using a scale of 0 to 2, laws that prohibit such 
terms are scored a 2.  Laws with partial restrictions are scored 1.  And, laws without any 
restrictions are assigned a score of 0. 
 
The enforcement mechanisms component of the index contains two measures: 
assignee liability and enforcement against originators.  The former measures the potential 
liability that purchasers or other assignees of mortgages have for wrongdoing by 
originators.  This measure is important because there has been concern that assignee 
liability provisions in state laws could impede the availability of credit or drive up the 
price of loans.  Our assignee liability measure assigns a 0 to laws that do not contemplate 
assignee liability unless the assignee had notice of the violation of the law before or at the 
time of the assignment or participated in the violation of the law.  Laws that allow 
borrowers to raise defenses, including claims of recoupment, to foreclosure or collection 
actions brought by assignees receive a 1.  Stronger laws that impose liability on assignees 
who fail to engage in due diligence designed to identify loans that contain predatory 
features are assigned a 2.  Laws that allow for limited claims against assignees even if 
they engage in due diligence are scored a 3.  This score also applies if assignees are liable 
for willful violations by originators.  The highest score is reserved for laws that impose 
liability on assignees without providing any due diligence safe harbors.  
 
The final measure takes into account the variation in enforcement schemes and 
available remedies against originators.  Laws that can only be enforced by state 
government, i.e., that preclude private lawsuits, are given the lowest score.  Those laws 
that allow private lawsuits for compensatory damages, but no punitive relief are scored a 
1 and those that allow private lawsuits with punitive relief are assigned a 2. 
4.1.2  Creating State Level Law Indexes 
 
State level law indexes were constructed using the component scoring system just 
described.  Similar to Ho and Pennington-Cross (2006b) each of the components is 
rescaled to insure that the indexes are not overly representative in terms of absolute value 
or variance of any single subcomponent.  For illustration, consider the law in Alabama 
and the coverage subcomponents (loan purpose, APR trigger 1st Lien, APR trigger higher 
liens, and points and fees trigger). Alabama does not have a mini-HOEPA law but does 
have an older law regulating subprime lending.  First, each subcomponent is divided by 
the maximum possible value, so that values will range from 0 to 1.  Alabama’s score for 
loan purpose was a 2, while the maximum allowable loan purpose score is 4.  Therefore, 
Alabama’s re-scaled loan purpose value is 0.5. The same procedure is used for the 
remaining subcomponents (APR trigger 1st Lien = 1, APR trigger higher liens = 1, and 
points and fees trigger = 1).  The sum of these values equals 3.5 for Alabama.  This 
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process is repeated for all laws.  Alabama’s coverage value is then divided by the average 
coverage value for all states (2.068627).  As a result, Alabama’s coverage index value is 
1.69 (3.5/ (2.068627).  This approach is applied to each of the dimensions that make up 
the coverage, restrictions and enforcement mechanisms indexes. As a result the average 
value of each of the indexes is 1. 
 
Lacking a generally accepted method for generating an index of this sort using the 
three component values, we build additive and multiplicative indexes to evaluate whether 
index construction drives results and, if so, how.  The additive version takes the value of 
each of the components and adds them together (indexA).  An additional question is 
whether the interaction of the components is important, which is less easily to establish 
using an additive index.  To explore this and obtain a better sense of the contingent nature 
of the components (for example, restrictions should only matter if they cover some of the 
market) a multiplicative index is also created.   This index takes each of the components 
and multiplies them together (indexM).36     
 
Separate indexes are created for the “new” mini-HOEPA laws and the older 
preexisting laws.  In general, the older laws were in effect prior to the first mini-HOEPA 
law, North Carolina, and did not follow the HOEPA structure.  Both indexes are created 
using the component scoring methodology and then added together to calculate a 
combined index.  
 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 provide the indexes for each of the 50 states and the District of 
Colmbia for the mini-HOEPA laws, the preexisting laws, and combined compilation.  
There is substantial variation in the laws across all components, but in general, it appears 
that laws with strong market coverage tend to have stronger restrictions and enforcement 
mechanisms (coverage, restrictions, and enforcement mechanisms are all positively 
correlated).  In addition, the mini-HOEPA and preexisting law components are only very 
weakly correlated (less than 10 percent) with each other in no obviously discernable 
fashion. 
4.2  Identification Strategy  
 
To identify the impact of anti-predatory lending laws on the subprime market, most of 
the literature uses state-level analyses, in either an event study or panel data framework, 
that focus on an indicator variable signifying whether a law is in effect.  However, by 
including all loans in the state this approach implicitly assumes that loans made on 
opposite ends of a state are similar and that all parts of the state are experiencing similar 
economic conditions.  These assumptions are very unlikely to hold and are especially 
problematic when using data sets with missing information (Elliehausen and Staten, 2004 
& 2006; Harvey and Nigro, 2003 & 2004; Li and Ernst, 2006). 
 
We use a different geographic sampling approach that focuses on lending activity 
along state borders.  Loans are included in the sample if they originate in a county that is 
geographically along a state border, if at least one of the two border states (the county's 
state and the neighboring state) has an anti-predatory lending law.  However, if the status 
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of anti-predatory lending laws in either state changes during the calendar year (e.g., new 
laws become effective or old ones are amended), the loans are excluded from the sample 
for that year.37   
 
This approach takes advantage of the non-economic nature of state boundaries.  
Because economic forces are typically quite similar in such neighboring counties, border 
pairs reflect a strong natural experiment which makes differences in the legal framework 
a focal point.  This recognition has made the border pair geographic sampling approach a 
standard in academic research on the effects of laws.  As examples, it has been used by 
Holmes (1998) to establish the relationship between right-to-work laws and employment, 
Pence (2006) to study the impact of foreclosure laws on mortgage markets, and Ho and 
Pennington-Cross (2006) to examine the effect of lending laws on mortgage markets.   
 
Table 7 describes the geographic distribution of loan originations along state borders.  
Each of these border pairs will effectively define a region through fixed effects (dummy 
variables).  Any remaining differences will be associated with control variables 
describing the borrower or applicant and the location of the property at the county and 
tract level.  This approach is best described as a differences-in-differences identification 
approach, which is augmented through a geographic-based sampling approach.   
 
The base model can thus be specified as: 
   
iiii
VAWV
ALFLj
jijiit OCCLocationBorrowerBorderLawOutcome   

543210
 
where i and j index, respectively, the individual loans and the state border pair, Law 
indicates whether the state where the loan originates has an anti-predatory lending law or 
laws and the strength of the law(s) across various dimensions,38  Border indicates that 
loans are in border counties for the indicated pair of states (North Carolina and Virginia, 
NCVA, being the excluded state border pair), Borrower represents borrower 
characteristics, Location represents location specific characteristics, OCC identifies 
whether the lender was regulated by the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), and ε represents an identically and independently distributed random error term.39  
Because the outcomes are binary, we estimate all relationships using the logit 
specification.40    
 
In the base model the vector Law only includes the variable Ineffect which indicates 
that the loan is in a state where an anti-predatory lending law is effective.  Ho & 
Pennington-Cross (2006b) and Li and Ernst (2006) show that such laws can have either 
positive or negative impacts on the volume of subprime lending but tend to depress 
rejection rates on average.  Therefore, the sign of the coefficient on Ineffect is largely 
indeterminate.  In alternative model specifications, Law includes (1) the full index or (2) 
the coverage, restrictions, and enforcement mechanisms indexes.  The full index is not 
expected to have much impact on the subprime mortgage market, because restrictions 
may depress the market by limiting the availability of some loan types, while coverage 
may stimulate demand in the market by making potential customers less fearful of 
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predation.  There is no prior evidence on the impact of enforcement mechanisms on the 
subprime mortgage market, but they may stimulate the market if potential customers are 
convinced that the law will eliminate any predation or depress the market if compliance is 
difficult or expensive. 
 
Since the border dummies control for the economic conditions along the border of 
geographically contiguous states, the sign of the coefficients could be positive or negative 
depending on local economic conditions. 
 
Table 8 includes variable descriptions and the source for the borrower and location 
controls.  We expect that borrowers will be more likely to use subprime loans in locations 
with depressed economic conditions, in areas with a high percentage of minority 
households, and when applicants have low income or are requesting large loan amounts 
relative to income (Calem, Gillen, and Wachter, 2004; Pennington-Cross, 2002).  The 
county housing vacancy rate, unemployment rate, and population growth over the prior 
year are included as proxies for location characteristics.   Borrower income, the loan-to-
income ratio, and the census tract's minority percentage are also included as proxies for 
borrower traits.  Unfortunately, borrower credit score data are not publicly available 
despite the fact that credit score is an important factor in underwriting both prime and 
subprime loans. 
 
Table 9 provides summary statistics for the estimation data set.  For each of the 
potential outcomes, 200,000 loans are randomly sampled from the appropriate border 
counties for estimation to reduce estimation time.  The 2004 data indicate that 16 to 18 
percent of loan originations are classified as subprime, 33 percent of applications are 
subprime, and 44 percent of subprime applications are rejected.  In addition, subprime 
borrowers tend to have substantially lower incomes, request higher loan-to-income ratios, 
and live in locations with more minorities, higher vacancy rates, higher unemployment 
rates, and lower density.  The 2005 data show a substantially higher fraction of subprime 
loans than in 2004 (27 percent versus 16 percent).   There are many small changes in the 
magnitude of all variables when comparing 2004 to 2005, but the summary statistics are 
very similar and these differences can reflect changes in the economic environment as 
well as the different composition of the sample.  
 
The last variable included is an indicator that the lender was regulated by the OCC.  
The OCC is the regulator of national banks and has exempted national banks from state 
and local anti-predatory lending laws.  Therefore, law impacts may differ for national 
banks, as identified by the OCC dummy variable. 
 
4.3  Logit Results 
 
Tables 10 and 11 provide the coefficient estimates, the standard errors, and the odds 
ratios for the location and borrower controls and the Ineffect dummy variable.  Table 10 
provides results for the origination outcome and Table 11 provides results for the 
application and rejection outcomes.  
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Law Variables -- The impact of the average law can be seen in Tables 10 and 11 by 
examining the coefficient and associated odds ratio for the Ineffect variable.  The typical 
law appears to have no measurable impact on the odds of applying for or entering into a 
subprime loan.  In addition, the typical law tends to reduce the odds of being rejected on 
a subprime application by 7 percent.  In summary, the typical law has very little impact 
on the subprime mortgage market in terms of overall credit flows.   
 
A similar result is found when one uses the multiplicative in place of the additive 
index (results not shown).  Most coefficients on this index were not significant and were 
of very small magnitudes when they were.  In short, the results here reinforce the 
previous finding and corroborate the results in Ho and Pennington-Cross (2006b) and Li 
and Ernst (2007) showing that the existence of a law has a very small impact on the flow 
of subprime credit. 
 
However, our hypothesis that the particulars of the legal framework are important 
suggests that further investigation is warranted.  Table 12 reports results from a series of 
specification tests that aim to establish the accuracy of our conjecture.  Panel A reports 
results for 2004 originations using the HUD list definition of subprime lending, panel B 
for 2004 originations using the HMDA price definition, panel C for 2005 originations 
using HMDA price definition, panel D for 2004 applications using the HUD list 
definition, and panel E for 2004 rejections using the HUD list definition.   
 
Each panel of the table reports the results for 5 alternative specifications, which the 
following discussion will draw on.  The first two specifications distinguish between the 
effects of older preexisting laws and newer mini-HOEPA laws.  The results here lend 
some weak support to the view that both sets of laws had an impact on subprime 
mortgage markets.  The existence of the older type of law on a state’s books is associated 
with an increased probability of a subprime loan being originated in some cases and not 
in others.  Similarly, results are mixed for the new laws, indicating that the laws had no 
effect on or led to a slight decline in the probability of subprime origination.  In all cases 
with significant coefficients, however, the magnitude of the effect is found to be quite 
small.  Furthermore, the similarity of results using the additive and multiplicative indexes 
suggests that the method of index construction is not driving the findings. 
 
Of course, the aggregated index is a blunt measure.  Two anti-predatory lending laws 
can have the same full index but actually be very different, depending on the relative 
strength of the three index components.  These variations can result in substantially 
different market responses.  As a result, we can gain more meaningful insights by 
analyzing the effect of each component of the index.  Specifications 3 and 4 in Table 12 
decompose the indexes into their components to test for these different impacts.   
 
Specification 3 shows the impact of the combined regulatory forces associated with 
the older laws and the more recent mini-HOEPA laws.  The results show that 
disaggregating the laws into their component parts is important.  For example, using the 
HUD list definition of subprime, the results for 2004 originations indicate that both 
restrictions and coverage rules have effects, and that these serve to negate each other.  An 
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increase in the restrictions component by one standard deviation (2.29 units) decreases 
the odds of originating a subprime loan by 9 percent, while an increase in the coverage 
component by one standard deviation (2.5 units) increases the odds of originating a 
subprime loan by 11 percent.  Similar findings for combined restrictions and coverage are 
observed in 2005 using the HMDA price definition of subprime.   
 
The results for 2004 originations using the HMDA price definition of subprime (panel 
B) differ from those in 2004 using the HUD list definition or those in 2005 using the 
HMDA price definition.  However, there are reasons to discount the 2004 HMDA price 
findings.  Avery, et. al (2006) provide evidence suggesting that many subprime loans 
were not identified as such in the 2004 because of yield curve dynamics.  As a result, the 
data are biased such that those subprime loans with lower APRs are omitted.  Another 
consequence is that many loans originated by specialized subprime lenders are not 
reported as such in the 2004 HMDA pricing data.  For example, Aames Funding 
Corporation reported that 55 percent of their loans were subprime in 2004 but 90 percent 
where subprime in 2005.  This pattern repeats among many subprime specialists.  In 
addition, because 2004 was the first year institutions were required to report pricing 
information, errors in reporting are likely.  Indeed, the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council issued guidance alerting HMDA reporters of potential problems 
after an initial review of submissions.41 
 
The origination results for enforcement are weaker than those for restrictions or 
coverage.  No relationship is observed between originations and enforcement in 2004 
using either definition, but we do observe an elevated probability of subprime 
originations in states with stronger enforcement in 2005.  The stronger enforcement 
schemes include private rights of action and assignee liability. 
 
Components are also significantly associated with applications (panel D) and 
rejections (panel E).  In contrast to findings in Ho and Pennington-Cross (2006), here the 
coverage component is negatively associated with applications.  All the components have 
a significant relationship with rejections.  Applicants in states with stronger restrictions 
are more likely to have their applications rejected.  However, greater coverage and more 
stringent enforcement are associated with fewer rejections of subprime mortgage 
applications.   
 
The fourth specification in the table decomposes these variables further by separately 
analyzing the components of mini-HOEPA laws and the older laws that govern only one 
or a few loan terms.  For originations, the evidence suggests that the newer mini-HOEPA 
laws have a greater effect than the older laws.  These effects have the same offsetting 
pattern we observed for the aggregated component indexes.  New restrictions on practices 
are significantly associated with a decreased likelihood of a subprime loan being 
originated, while new laws featuring expanded coverage tend to increase the probability 
of a loan being originated. 
 
For applications and rejections, the story is a bit different in that both the older and 
newer laws appear to play a role in subprime market outcomes.  Both sets of laws are 
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significantly associated with both applications and rejections and the component effects 
for both sets of laws are often quite similar.  Expanded coverage is associated with 
reduced probabilities of both and restrictions are associated with higher probabilities of 
both (weakly for applications).  Interestingly, new increased enforcement is significantly 
associated with decreased likelihoods of subprime application and rejection.   
 
Control Variables -- The results for the probability of origination are very consistent 
across different years and using different definitions of subprime.  For example, the odds 
ratio for income range from 0.92 to 0.95 and the coefficient estimate is significant in all 
three regressions.  Similarly consistent results are found for the minority, unemployment, 
and OCC variables.  In addition, the loan2income variable always reduces the odds of 
originating a subprime loan, and more densely populated areas are always associated with 
a lower probability of originating a subprime loan.  Put simply, a subprime origination is 
most likely in locations with high percentages of minority residents and people on low 
incomes, and with high rates of unemployment in both 2004 and 2005. 
 
In terms of applications, borrowers in locations with a concentration of minority 
households tend to apply for subprime loans much more often (odds ratio = 3.61) as well 
as households with lower incomes (odds ratio = 0.95) and higher unemployment rates 
(odds ratio = 1.04).  The probability of being rejected on a subprime application also 
meets expectations.  For example, lower incomes, higher unemployment rates, and living 
in a predominantly minority area all increase the odds of having a subprime application 
rejected. 
 
5.  Discussion and Conclusion 
  
The current research builds upon prior research examining the effects of anti-
predatory lending laws on subprime lending markets.  It uses a new, improved data set 
that better describes the legal landscape regarding predatory lending.  This new data 
permit a broader coverage of states, an assessment of whether effects differ according to 
whether a law was an older preexisting statute or a newer mini-HOEPA law, and the 
evaluation of the effects of remedies against originators and assignee liability.   
 
Our results are consistent with the view that anti-predatory lending laws influence 
subprime lending markets.  The analysis indicates that the presence of state-level laws 
that regulate subprime lending, when considered in the aggregate, appear to have little 
impact on subprime originations, applications or rejections.  However, the empirics also 
show that disaggregating the details of the overall legal framework into its component 
parts is important for understanding subprime market dynamics.  The results for the 
restrictions component are consistent with expectations and the prior literature.  More 
restrictive state laws reduce subprime originations and increase subprime rejection 
likelihoods.  Regarding coverage, although laws with broader coverage are associated 
with reduced subprime application propensities, they are also associated with lower 
subprime rejection rates.  On balance, the reduction in rejection propensity appears to 
outweigh the application effect, as we observe higher subprime origination propensities 
in states with broader coverage.  Finally, variation in enforcement provisions is not 
8/7/2007 20 
associated with subprime origination or application likelihoods, but we do observe a 
significant reduction in rejection probabilities as enforcement methods strengthen.  
 
In terms of other implications of the research, the component analysis suggests that 
the lack of an overall relationship is explained by the opposing restrictions and coverage 
effects.  In short, the evidence here argues strongly that the design of the legal framework 
is important for market outsomes.  The results also suggest that the newer mini-HOEPA 
laws have had a impact on the subprime market above and beyond the older preexisting 
laws, particularly for subprime originations.  Finally, the evidence that laws with broader 
coverage lead to an increased probability of applications is broadly consistent with the 
reverse lemons hypothesis put forward by Ho and Pennington-Cross (2007).  This theory 
argues that a legal framework provides a protection to borrowers that induces 
creditworthy applicants who had opted out of the market to apply for loans.   
 
The results also point to the need for additional research.  Questions remain as to the 
how the interaction of the various legal framework components shape subprime market 
outcomes.  For example, restrictions and enforcement might be mutually reinforcing or 
one might negate the effect of the other.  Additional research might focus on how credit 
quality drives observed relationships, particularly in the context of subprime underwriting 
and rejection rates.  Finally, the analysis indicated that OCC activity influences subprime 
market outcomes.  Future research might explore this further, particularly given the issue 
of OCC preemption.  The differing levels of regulations for institutions could 
conceivably affect the distribution of applications and originations.   
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Table 1:  The North Carolina Anti-Predatory Lending Law 
 
Stage 1 (effective date October 1, 1999) 
These provisions apply to certain closed-end, owner-occupied residential mortgages 
without regard to APRs or points and fees.   
 
 Bans the following activities 
o Balloon payments in home loans (defined as closed-end, first-lien loans of 
under $300,000) with terms of over six months 
o Prepayment penalties and cap fees in home loans for personal use of under 
$150,000 
o Payoff fees in loans under $300,000 
 Proscribes encouraging consumer home loan borrowers to default 
 Prohibits loan flipping (defined as refinancings of consumer home loans without a 
reasonable, tangible net benefit to the borrowers).  
 
Stage 2 (effective date July 1, 2000) 
Most of these provisions apply to high-cost home loans,a defined as closed-end, owner-
occupied loans (other than reverse mortgages) for personal use under Fannie Mae’s 
conforming loan size or $300,000 that exceed either one of the following thresholds:b 
 
(a) where the APR at consummation exceeds the yield on Treasury securities of 
comparable maturity plus eight percent (ten percent) for first-lien loans  
(subordinate-lien loans) ; or 
(b) where total points and fees exceed 5 percent of the total loan amount for loans 
of $20,000 or more, or the lesser of $1000 or 8 percent of the total loan 
amount for loans under $20,000.c 
 
 Regulates the following provisions 
o Acceleration clauses 
o Balloon payments 
o Negative amortization 
o Interest rates upon default 
o Advance payments 
o Modification and deferral fees 
o Loans without regard to ability to repay 
o Financing of fees 
o Loan flipping 
o Payments to home contractors from loan proceeds 
 Requires loan applicants to obtain advance loan counseling from a certified counselor 
in order to close on a high-cost loan. 
 
NOTES: (a) North Carolina provisions banning the financing of single payment credit insurance in 
consumer home loans did not go into effect until July 1, 2000; (b) 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 332 (1999), 
codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. 24-1.1A, 24-1.1E, 24-2.5, 24-8, 24-10.2.; (c) For this trigger, the North Carolina 
law expanded the definition of “points and fees” beyond the meaning in HOEPA to include other mortgage 
broker compensation and many large prepayment penalties.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-1.1E(6).
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Table 2: States with mini-HOEPA laws (as of January 1, 2007) 
 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Florida 
Georgia 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Minnesota 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
North Carolina 
Ohio (2006 law only) a  
Oklahoma 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Utah 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Washington, D.C. 
 
NOTES: (a) Ohio Revised Code § 1349.25 (to take effect on January 1, 2007).  In late 2006, before the 
effective date of the new Ohio law, the state legislature amended these new anti-predatory lending 
provisions to curtail the strength of the law.  The outgoing governor neither signed nor vetoed the 
amendments.  In January 2007, the newly-elected governor vetoed the amendments.  There is uncertainty 
whether the veto will be deemed effective, making uncertain the status of the new Ohio mini-HOEPA law. 
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Table 3: Coding rules for scoring state-level anti-predatory lending lawsa  
Coverage dimensions  
Loan typeb 0 = HOEPA equivalent (excludes home purchase, reverse 
mortgages, open-ended loans) 
1 = law does not cover government loans 
2 = law does not cover reverse and/or open-ended loans  
3 = law does not cover business and/or construction loans  
4 = law covers all loans 
APR trigger for first lien 
mortgages 
0 = HOEPA equivalent (8% plus comparable Treasury 
security yield)  
1 = 7-8 % plus the comparable Treasury security yield  
2 = 6-7 % plus the comparable Treasury security yield  
3 = no APR trigger 
APR trigger for 
subordinate mortgages 
0 = HOEPA equivalent (10% plus comparable Treasury 
security yield) 
1 = 9-10% plus comparable Treasury security yield  
2 = 8-9% plus comparable Treasury security yield  
3 = 6-8% plus comparable Treasury security yield  
4 = no APR trigger 
Points and fees triggerc 0 = HOEPA equivalent (8% of loan amount or $400) 
1 = 6-8 % of the total loan amountd  
2 = 5-6 % of the total loan amount 
3 = less than 5 % of the total loan amount 
4 = no points and fees trigger 
Restrictions dimensions  
Prepayment penaltiese 0 = no prepayment penalty restrictions 
1 = bans all penalties 60-84 months after origination 
2 = bans all penalties 36-42 months after origination 
3 = bans all penalties 24 months after origination 
4 = bans all prepayment penalties 
Balloon paymentsf 0 = no restriction 
1 = no balloons allowed in first 7 years of loan 
2 = no balloons allowed in first 10 years of loan 
3 = no balloons allowed after 10 or more years of loan 
4 = no balloons allowed 
Credit counseling 
requirementsg 
0 = credit counseling not required  
1 = credit counseling recommended or lender must give 
borrowers notice of right to/value of credit counseling  
2 = credit counseling is required 
Limits on judicial relief/ 
mandatory arbitrationh 
0 =  does not prohibit restrictions on judicial reliefi and 
mandatory arbitration 
1 =  limitsj restrictions on judicial relief and mandatory 
arbitration 
2 =  prohibits mandatory arbitration and other restrictions 
on judicial relief 
Enforcement mechanisms  
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Assignee liabilityk 0 = no assignee liability for holders in due course 
1 = borrowers can only seek relief against assignees as 
defenses, including claims of recoupment, to assignee 
foreclosure and/ or collection actions  
2 = Hold liable only those assignees who do not exercise 
due diligence 
3 = even if assignees exercised due diligence, they may be 
subject to limited claims and defenses or assignees are 
liable for willful violations by originators regardless of 
any due diligence  
4 = assignees are liable even if they exercise due diligence 
Enforcement against 
originatorsl 
0 = only the state government can enforce anti-predatory 
lending laws 
1 = borrowers have a private right of action and can 
recover compensatory, but no punitive damages, statutory 
damages that are non-compensatory,m or civil penalties  
2 = borrowers can bring private lawsuits and recover 
compensatory damages, and punitive damages, statutory 
non-compensatory damages or civil penalties 
NOTES: (a) The index includes only laws that were in effect by January 1, 2005; (b) This measure is coded 
using the most conservative assessment of coverage.  For example, a law that excludes coverage for 
business loans and open-ended loans is coded 2.  Laws that exclude consumer credit transactions or loans 
for personal use are coded as excluding business loans.; (c) If a law’s points and fees triggers varied based 
on the amount of the loan, we scored the law based on the triggers that applied to the largest loan amount.  
The $400 trigger is indexed annually for inflation; (d) If the law extends HOEPA in other ways without 
changing the trigger and the trigger is not 6 percent or lower of the total loan amount, the score equals 1.; 
(e) Laws that permit reasonable and necessary prepayment penalties are coded as 0.  If a law uses 
prepayment penalties to determine coverage triggers, but does not ban prepayment penalties, it is assigned a 
0.; (f) Laws that prohibit balloon payments larger than twice the monthly payment without any restrictions 
in time were scored as a 4.; (g) If counseling is required for some but not all types of loans, the score is 2.  
Similarly, if counseling was recommended for any type of loan the score is a 1.; (h) Laws that ban 
unconscionable arbitration terms receive a score of 1.; (i) Restrictions on judicial relief include provisions 
requiring borrowers to resolve disputes in a less convenient, more expensive forum than the one in which 
the borrower otherwise could have brought the claim.; (j) For example, a law may prohibit mandatory 
arbitration clauses that do not require the lenders to pay half the filing fee or do not obligate the lender to 
pay its own and the borrowers’ arbitration fees for the first day of arbitration.; (k) If borrowers can obtain 
rescission against assignees, the measure is assigned a 4.  If the law precludes assignee liability unless the 
violation is apparent on the face of the loan documents, the score is 0.  However, for any law for which all 
violations would be apparent on the face of the loan documents, assignees could not be deemed holders in 
due course and, therefore, such laws are assigned a 4.; (l) If the law provides that violations of the anti-
predatory lending law would give rise to claims under the state unfair and deceptive trade practices 
(UDAP) laws, the relief is coded according to the UDAP law.  If the only remedy available is refund of an 
unlawful prepayment penalty, this measure is coded as a 1; (m) This includes laws that permit borrowers to 
recover an amount equal to a set multiplier times actual damages. 
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Table 4: New Laws Index – Mini-HOEPA Laws, 2004-2005 
State Coverage Restrictions Enforcement 
IndexA -- 
Additive 
IndexM -- 
Multiplicative 
Alaska 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Alabama 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Arizona 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Arkansas 1.72 2.73 2.11 6.56 9.92 
California 2.15 1.36 1.41 4.93 4.13 
Colorado 0.43 1.64 2.11 4.18 1.49 
Connecticut 0.86 1.91 2.11 4.88 3.47 
Delaware 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
District of Columbia 3.74 1.91 2.11 7.75 15.05 
Florida 0.00 1.64 2.11 3.75 0.00 
Georgia 1.72 3.00 2.11 6.83 10.91 
Hawaii 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Idaho 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Illinois 3.74 1.91 2.46 8.11 17.56 
Indiana 1.29 3.00 2.46 6.76 9.55 
Iowa 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Kansas 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Kentucky 0.86 2.18 2.81 5.86 5.29 
Louisiana 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maine 0.00 0.55 2.46 3.01 0.00 
Maryland 1.44 0.55 1.41 3.39 1.10 
Massachusetts  2.15 3.82 2.46 8.44 20.26 
Michigan 5.17 0.82 0.00 5.99 0.00 
Minnesota 6.46 0.55 0.00 7.01 0.00 
Mississippi 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Missouri 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Montana 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Nebraska 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Nevada 0.00 0.00 2.81 2.81 0.00 
New Hampshire 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
New Jersey 2.15 2.73 2.46 7.34 14.47 
New Mexico 4.17 3.27 2.46 9.90 33.57 
New York 2.15 1.91 1.76 5.82 7.23 
North Carolina 1.72 3.27 1.41 6.40 7.94 
North Dakota 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ohio 0.00 1.36 2.11 3.47 0.00 
Oklahoma 0.00 2.18 2.11 4.29 0.00 
Oregon 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pennsylvania 0.00 1.36 2.11 3.47 0.00 
Rhode Island 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
South Carolina 0.86 2.18 1.76 4.80 3.31 
South Dakota 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Tennessee 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Texas 0.86 1.36 2.11 4.34 2.48 
Utah 1.72 2.18 0.00 3.91 0.00 
Vermont 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Virginia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Washington 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
West Virginia 5.60 1.64 1.76 9.00 16.12 
Wisconsin 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Wyoming 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Average 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 3.61 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 6.46 3.82 2.81 9.90 33.57 
Standard Deviation 1.62 1.17 1.10 3.19 6.90 
If all columns are zeros then no law was identified. 
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Table 5: Old or Preexisting Law Index – Enacted Before Mini-HOEPA Laws and In 
Effect 2004-2005 
State Coverage Restrictions Enforcement 
IndexA -- 
Additive 
IndexM -- 
Multiplicative 
Alaska 1.69 2.68 0.64 5.02 2.91 
Alabama 1.57 2.68 2.57 6.82 10.82 
Arizona 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Arkansas 1.93 1.34 0.00 3.28 0.00 
California 1.93 0.67 1.92 4.53 2.50 
Colorado 1.45 2.68 1.92 6.06 7.49 
Connecticut 1.81 1.34 0.00 3.15 0.00 
Delaware 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
District of Columbia 1.93 1.34 1.28 4.56 3.33 
Florida 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Georgia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hawaii 0.85 0.67 1.92 3.44 1.09 
Idaho 1.81 1.34 2.57 5.72 6.24 
Illinois 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Indiana 1.93 1.34 1.92 5.20 4.99 
Iowa 1.93 2.68 0.64 5.26 3.33 
Kansas 1.93 2.68 2.57 7.18 13.32 
Kentucky 1.57 0.67 1.92 4.17 2.03 
Louisiana 1.81 0.67 0.00 2.48 0.00 
Maine 1.57 2.68 1.92 6.18 8.12 
Maryland 1.57 2.68 2.57 6.82 10.82 
Massachusetts  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Michigan 1.57 1.34 0.96 3.88 2.03 
Minnesota 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mississippi 1.93 0.67 1.92 4.53 2.50 
Missouri 1.81 0.67 1.92 4.41 2.34 
Montana 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Nebraska 1.93 0.00 0.64 2.58 0.00 
Nevada 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
New Hampshire 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
New Jersey 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
New Mexico 1.93 2.68 2.57 7.18 13.32 
New York 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
North Carolina 1.69 1.34 1.92 4.96 4.37 
North Dakota 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ohio 1.93 0.67 1.92 4.53 2.50 
Oklahoma 0.97 2.68 2.57 6.22 6.66 
Oregon 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pennsylvania 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Rhode Island 1.93 2.01 0.00 3.95 0.00 
South Carolina 1.93 2.68 2.57 7.18 13.32 
South Dakota 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Tennessee 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Texas 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Utah 1.81 2.68 2.57 7.06 12.49 
Vermont 1.57 2.68 1.92 6.18 8.12 
Virginia 1.81 0.00 2.57 4.38 0.00 
Washington 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
West Virginia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Wisconsin 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Wyoming 0.85 2.68 2.57 6.10 5.83 
Average 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 2.95 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 1.93 2.68 2.57 7.18 13.32 
Standard Deviation 0.88 1.12 1.09 2.75 4.22 
8/7/2007 31 
If all columns are zeros then no law was identified. 
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Table 6: Complete or Combined Index, 2004-2005 
State Coverage Restrictions Enforcement 
IndexA -- 
Additive 
IndexM -- 
Multiplicative 
Alaska 1.69 2.68 0.64 5.02 2.91 
Alabama 1.57 2.68 2.57 6.82 10.82 
Arizona 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Arkansas 3.66 4.07 2.11 9.84 9.92 
California 4.09 2.03 3.33 9.45 6.63 
Colorado 1.88 4.32 4.03 10.24 8.98 
Connecticut 2.67 3.25 2.11 8.04 3.47 
Delaware 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
District of Columbia 5.67 3.25 3.39 12.31 18.38 
Florida 0.00 1.64 2.11 3.75 0.00 
Georgia 1.72 3.00 2.11 6.83 10.91 
Hawaii 0.85 0.67 1.92 3.44 1.09 
Idaho 1.81 1.34 2.57 5.72 6.24 
Illinois 3.74 1.91 2.46 8.11 17.56 
Indiana 3.23 4.34 4.39 11.96 14.54 
Iowa 1.93 2.68 0.64 5.26 3.33 
Kansas 1.93 2.68 2.57 7.18 13.32 
Kentucky 2.43 2.85 4.74 10.02 7.32 
Louisiana 1.81 0.67 0.00 2.48 0.00 
Maine 1.57 3.23 4.39 9.19 8.12 
Maryland 3.01 3.23 3.97 10.21 11.92 
Massachusetts  2.15 3.82 2.46 8.44 20.26 
Michigan 6.74 2.16 0.96 9.87 2.03 
Minnesota 6.46 0.55 0.00 7.01 0.00 
Mississippi 1.93 0.67 1.92 4.53 2.50 
Missouri 1.81 0.67 1.92 4.41 2.34 
Montana 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Nebraska 1.93 0.00 0.64 2.58 0.00 
Nevada 0.00 0.00 2.81 2.81 0.00 
New Hampshire 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
New Jersey 2.15 2.73 2.46 7.34 14.47 
New Mexico 6.10 5.96 5.03 17.08 46.89 
New York 2.15 1.91 1.76 5.82 7.23 
North Carolina 3.42 4.61 3.33 11.36 12.31 
North Dakota 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ohio 1.93 2.03 4.03 8.00 2.50 
Oklahoma 0.97 4.87 4.68 10.51 6.66 
Oregon 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pennsylvania 0.00 1.36 2.11 3.47 0.00 
Rhode Island 1.93 2.01 0.00 3.95 0.00 
South Carolina 2.80 4.87 4.32 11.99 16.63 
South Dakota 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Tennessee 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Texas 0.86 1.36 2.11 4.34 2.48 
Utah 3.54 4.87 2.57 10.97 12.49 
Vermont 1.57 2.68 1.92 6.18 8.12 
Virginia 1.81 0.00 2.57 4.38 0.00 
Washington 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
West Virginia 5.60 1.64 1.76 9.00 16.12 
Wisconsin 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Wyoming 0.85 2.68 2.57 6.10 5.83 
Average 2.00 2.00 2.00 6.00 6.56 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 8.40 6.50 5.38 17.08 46.89 
Standard Deviation 2.50 2.29 2.19 4.18 8.39 
If all columns are zeros then no law was identified. 
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Table 7: Distribution of Originations on State Borders 
State Border 2004 2005 State Border 2004 2005 
ALFL 0.01 0.01 KSOK 0.00 0.00 
ALGA 0.01 0.01 KSNE  0.00 
ALMS 0.01 0.01 KYTN 0.01 0.01 
ALTN 0.01 0.01 KYOH 0.02 0.02 
ARLA 0.00 0.00 KYWV 0.00 0.00 
ARMO 0.00 0.01 KYMO  0.00 
AROK 0.01 0.01 KYVA  0.00 
ARTN 0.01 0.01 LATX 0.01 0.01 
ARMS 0.00 0.00 LAMS 0.00 0.00 
AZNM 0.00 0.00 MANY 0.00 0.00 
AZUT   0.01 MARI  0.02 
AZCA 0.00 0.01 MANH   
AZNV 0.05 0.05 MAVT  0.00 
CANV 0.12 0.11 MDPA 0.05 0.05 
CAOR 0.00 0.01 MDWV 0.00 0.00 
ARCA 0.11 0.09 MDVA 0.05 0.04 
CONM   0.00 MENH 0.01  
COKS 0.00 0.00 MIWI   
COUT   0.00 MIOH 0.01 0.01 
COWY 0.01 0.01 MNSD 0.00 0.00 
CONE   0.00 MNWI 0.02  
CTNY 0.03 0.02 MNND 0.00 0.00 
CTMA   0.02 MONE  0.00 
CTRI 0.01 0.02 MOOK 0.00 0.00 
DCVA 0.01 0.01 MOTN  0.00 
DEMD 0.01 0.02 MSTN 0.01 0.01 
FLGA 0.01 0.01 MTWY  0.00 
GASC 0.01 0.01 NCVA 0.02 0.02 
GATN 0.01 0.01 NCSC 0.04 0.04 
GANC   0.00 NCTN 0.00 0.01 
IAWI 0.00   NEWY 0.00 0.00 
IAMO   0.00 NESD 0.00 0.00 
IAIL 0.01 0.00 NHVT   
IAMN   0.00 NJNY 0.05 0.04 
IASD 0.00 0.00 NJPA 0.07 0.07 
IANE 0.01 0.01 NMTX 0.01 0.01 
IDNV   0.00 NVUT  0.01 
IDOR 0.00 0.00 NVOR 0.01 0.01 
IDUT   0.00 NYPA 0.01 0.01 
IDWA 0.01 0.01 NYVT 0.00 0.01 
IDMT 0.00 0.00 OHPA 0.01 0.01 
IDWY 0.00 0.00 OHWV 0.00 0.00 
ILMO 0.04 0.03 OKTX 0.00 0.00 
ILWI 0.03 0.00 DEPA 0.02 0.02 
ILIN 0.10 0.09 PAWV 0.01 0.00 
ILKY   0.00 SDWY 0.00 0.00 
INOH 0.02 0.02 TNVA 0.00 0.00 
INKY 0.02 0.02 ARTX 0.00 0.00 
INMI 0.01 0.01 UTWY  0.00 
KSMO 0.03 0.03 VAWV 0.01 0.01 
Missing information indicates that loans on that border are excluded from the sample either due to a law 
coming into effect during the year or insufficient sample size (less than 0.001 percent of the sample). 
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Table 8: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Source 
  Outcome Variables     
Origination (price ID) 
Indicator variable = 1 for subprime origination; 
0 for prime origination; Subprime loans 
identified by reported APR spread HMDA 
Origination (list ID) 
Indicator variable = 1 for subprime application; 
0 for prime application; Subprime loans 
identified by HUD subprime lender list HMDA & HUD 
Application 
Indicator variable = 1 for subprime application; 
0 for prime application; Subprime loans 
identified by HUD subprime lender list HMDA & HUD 
Rejection 
Indicator variable = 1 for rejected subprime 
application; 0 for accepted subprime application; 
Subprime loans identified by HUD subprime 
lender list HMDA & HUD 
  Control Variables   
Income (thousands $) Borrower's gross annual income (in thousands $) HMDA 
Loan2inc 
Ratio of requested loan amount to borrower's 
income HMDA 
Minority Tract's minority population percentage HMDA 
Population 
County's percentage growth over the prior 
calendar year Census Bureau 
Vacant County's percentage of vacant housing units Census Bureau 
Unemployment County's unemployment rate 
Bureau of Labor and 
Statistics 
Density 
Census tract population density (100's per 
square mile) Census Bureau 
OCC 
Lending institution regulated by the Office of 
Currency Comptroller HMDA 
During estimation income is expressed in millions, all percentages are expressed as fractions. 
 
8/7/2007 35 
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics 
  2005 2004 
Variable Origination Sample Origination Sample Application Sample Rejection Sample 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
  Outcome Variables                 
Origination (price ID) 0.27 0.45 0.16 0.36     
Origination (list ID)   0.18 0.39     
Application     0.33 0.47   
Rejection       0.44 0.50 
  Control Variables              
Income (thousands $) 86.68 61.98 83.10 58.92 77.95 57.47 65.88 46.12 
Loan2inc 2.19 1.42 2.22 1.37 2.25 1.52 2.37 1.66 
Minority (%) 25.90 25.49 26.44 25.50 28.86 27.38 35.91 30.73 
Population (%) 1.36 1.78 1.56 1.85 1.51 1.82 1.48 1.84 
Vacant (%) 8.72 6.41 7.49 4.55 7.61 4.55 7.78 4.25 
Unemployment (%) 5.02 1.52 5.26 1.46 5.35 1.48 5.54 1.46 
Density 1.72 4.62 1.97 5.17 1.97 5.02 1.85 4.05 
OCC (%) 24.66 43.10 27.29 44.54 23.20 42.21 2.86 16.65 
Number of Loans 200,000   200,000   200,000   200,000   
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Table 10: Logit Base Model Results – Origination  
 
Year 2004 2005 
Subprime def. HUD List HMDA Price HMDA Price 
 
Variable 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Intercept 
-1.28** 
(0.07) 
-- -0.77** 
(0.07) 
-- -0.75** 
(0.06) 
-- 
ineffect 
0.07 
(0.05) 
1.07 -0.06 
(0.05) 
0.95 0.03 
(0.04) 
1.03 
Income  
-5.57** 
(0.16) 
0.95 -8.31** 
(0.18) 
0.92 -5.68** 
(0.12) 
0.94 
Loan2inc 
-0.01* 
(0.00) 
0.99 -0.27** 
(0.01) 
0.76 -0.14** 
(0.00) 
0.87 
Minority 
1.59** 
(0.03) 
4.9 1.56** 
(0.03) 
4.77 1.68** 
(0.02) 
5.34 
Vacant 
-0.42 
(0.22) 
0.66 0.47* 
(0.21) 
1.61 -0.09 
(0.12) 
0.91 
Population 
2.03** 
(0.64) 
7.58 -1.42* 
(0.68) 
0.24 0.83 
(0.49) 
2.30 
Unemployment 
2.52** 
(0.72) 
1.03 3.05** 
(0.72) 
1.03 3.22** 
(0.51) 
1.03 
Density 
-0.02** 
(0.00) 
0.98 -0.03** 
(0.00) 
0.97 -0.03** 
(0.00) 
0.97 
OCC 
-4.25** 
(0.06) 
0.01  0.27 -1.09** 
(0.01) 
0.34 
Log Likelihood -78,948  -78,189  -107,182  
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significance at 5% level. ** Significance at the 1% level. 
State-County border pair fixed effects included in all specifications.  NCVA is the excluded border area.  
State-County border pair coefficient estimates are available on request from the authors. 
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Table 11: Logit Base Model Results – Application and Rejection rates 
 
Year 2004 
Dep. Var. Applications Rejection rates 
 
Variable 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Intercept 
-0.60** 
(0.06) 
-- -0.30** 
(0.05) 
-- 
ineffect 
0.05 
(0.04) 
1.05 -0.08* 
(0.04) 
0.93 
Income  
-4.64** 
(0.12) 
0.95 -1.90** 
(0.12) 
0.98 
Loan2inc 
0.04** 
(0.00) 
1.04 0.06** 
(0.00) 
1.06 
Minority 
1.28** 
(0.02) 
3.61 0.12** 
(0.02) 
1.13 
Vacant 
-0.26 
(0.17) 
0.77 -0.37* 
(0.16) 
0.69 
Population 
0.47 
(0.54) 
1.61 -0.69 
(0.49) 
0.50 
Unemployment 
4.36** 
(0.62) 
1.04 5.36** 
(0.53) 
1.06 
Density 
-0.02** 
(0.00) 
0.98 0.00* 
(0.00) 
1.00 
OCC 
-3.19** 
(0.03) 
0.04 -0.53** 
(0.03) 
0.59 
Log Likelihood -106,164  -134,143  
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significance at 5% level. ** Significance at the 1% level. 
State-County border pair fixed effects included in all specifications.  NCVA is the excluded border area.  
State-County border pair coefficient estimates are available on request from the authors. 
 
Table 12: Logit Results for Alternative Model Specifications 
A. 2004 Originations, HUD List Definition of Subprime 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Old IndexA 0.01 (0.01) 
1.01      
 
 
New IndexA 0.00 (0.00) 
1.00      
 
 
Old IndexM   0.00 (0.00) 
1.00    
 
 
New IndexM   -0.01** (0.00) 
0.99    
 
 
Combined 
restrictions 
    -0.04* 
(0.01) 
0.96   
Combined 
coverage 
    0.04** 
(0.01) 
1.04   
Combined 
enforcement 
    0.01 
(0.02) 
1.01   
Old restrictions       -0.01 (0.02) 
0.99 
Old coverage       0.00 (0.03) 
1.00 
Old enforcement       0.05 (0.03) 
1.05 
New restrictions       -0.05* (0.02) 
0.95 
New coverage       0.04** (0.01) 
1.04 
New enforcement       -0.01 (0.02) 
0.99 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  * Significance at 5% level. ** Significance at the 
1% level.  The unit of change when evaluating the odds ratio is one.
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B. 2004 Originations, HMDA Price Definition of Subprime 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Old IndexA 0.02** (0.01) 
1.02       
New IndexA 0.00* (0.00) 
1.00       
Old IndexM   0.01** (0.00) 
1.01     
New IndexM   0.00 (0.00) 
1.00     
Combined 
restrictions 
    0.04** 
(0.01) 
1.04   
Combined 
coverage 
    0.00 
(0.00) 
1.00   
Combined 
enforcement 
    -0.02 
(0.02) 
0.98   
Old restrictions       0.05** (0.02) 
1.05 
Old coverage       -0.02 (0.03) 
0.98 
Old enforcement       0.03 (0.02) 
1.03 
New restrictions       0.06** (0.02) 
1.06 
New coverage       0.00 (0.01) 
1.00 
New enforcement       -0.07** (0.02) 
0.93 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  * Significance at 5% level. ** Significance at the 
1% level.  The unit of change when evaluating the odds ratio is one. 
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C. 2005 Originations, HMDA Price List Definition of Subprime 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Old IndexA 0.02** (0.00) 
1.02       
New IndexA 0.00 (0.00) 
1.00       
Old IndexM   0.01** (0.00) 
1.01 
 
    
New IndexM   0.00 (0.00) 
1.00     
Combined 
restrictions 
    -0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.98   
Combined 
coverage 
    0.03** 
(0.01) 
1.03   
Combined 
enforcement 
    0.03* 
(0.01) 
1.03   
Old restrictions       0.00 (0.01) 
1.00 
Old coverage       0.03 (0.02) 
1.03 
Old enforcement       0.03* (0.02) 
1.03 
New restrictions       -0.05* (0.02) 
0.95 
New coverage       0.03** (0.01) 
1.03 
New enforcement       0.02 (0.02) 
1.02 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  * Significance at 5% level. ** Significance at the 
1% level.  The unit of change when evaluating the odds ratio is one.
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D. 2004 Applications, HUD List Definition of Subprime 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Old IndexA 0.00 (0.00) 
1.00       
New IndexA -0.01** (0.00) 
0.99       
Old IndexM   0.00 (0.00) 
1.00     
New IndexM   -0.01** (0.00) 
0.99     
Combined 
restrictions 
    0.01 
(0.01) 
1.01   
Combined 
coverage 
    -0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.98   
Combined 
enforcement 
    0.00 
(0.01) 
1.00   
Old restrictions       0.03* (0.01) 
1.03 
Old coverage       -0.11** (0.03) 
0.90 
Old enforcement       0.06** (0.02) 
1.06 
New restrictions       0.03 (0.02) 
1.03 
New coverage       -0.02** (0.01) 
0.98 
New enforcement       -0.05** (0.02) 
0.95 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  * Significance at 5% level. ** Significance at the 
1% level.  The unit of change when evaluating the odds ratio is one.
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E. 2004 Rejection rates, HUD List Definition of Subprime 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Estimate Odds 
Ratio 
Old IndexA -0.01** (0.00) 
0.99       
New IndexA 0.00 (0.00) 
1.00       
Old IndexM   -0.01** (0.00) 
0.99     
New IndexM   0.00** (0.00) 
1.00     
Combined 
restrictions 
    0.08** 
(0.01) 
1.08   
Combined 
coverage 
    -0.08** 
(0.01) 
0.92   
Combined 
enforcement 
    -0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.97   
Old restrictions       0.04** (0.01) 
1.04 
Old coverage       -0.08** (0.02) 
0.93 
Old enforcement       -0.03 (0.02) 
0.97 
New restrictions       0.13** (0.02) 
1.14 
New coverage       -0.08** (0.01) 
0.92 
New enforcement       -0.04* (0.02) 
0.96 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  * Significance at 5% level. ** Significance at the 1% level.  
The unit of change when evaluating the odds ratio is one 
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1 The subprime market is designed for borrowers with unconventional or blemished credit histories and 
charges higher interest rates and fees. 
 
2 In 1998, subprime mortgages comprised 2.4% of outstanding home mortgage loans; by the second quarter 
of 2006, they made up 13.4%.  Duncan (2006). 
 
3 While predatory lending is hard to define with precision, it generally either involves excessive prices in 
view of the borrowers’ risk or lending without regard to borrowers’ ability to repay.  Engel and McCoy 
(2006) define predatory lending as a syndrome of loan terms or practices involving one or more of the 
following features:  (1) loans structured to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to borrowers; (2) 
rent-seeking; (3) illegal fraud or deception; (4) other information asymmetries favoring brokers or lenders; 
(5) mandatory arbitration clauses; (6) lending discrimination; and (7) servicing abuses. 
 
4 On a parallel front, federal, state and local authorities have brought civil and criminal claims against 
numerous subprime mortgage lenders and brokers for violations of lending laws, see e.g. Engel & McCoy 
(2007). 
 
5 Azmy (2005).   
 
6 For discussion of negative externalities from abusive mortgage lending, see, e.g., Apgar & Duda (2005), 
Engel (2006), and Quercia, Cowan & Moreno (2005). 
 
7  For the year ending December 30, 2006, delinquencies stood at 13.3 percent for subprime loans generally 
and 14.4 percent for subprime adjustable-rate mortgages. Mortgage Bankers Association (2007). 
 
8 Peterson (2004). 
 
9 Eskridge (1984); Whitman (1992).  Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming adopted the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.  Legal Information 
Institute (2007).  Not all states’ versions of the U.C.C.C., however, regulate prepayment clauses or balloon 
clauses. 
 
10 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1)–(4); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1), (b)(1).  For 2007, the dollar trigger was raised to 
$547.  71 Fed. Reg. 46388 (Aug. 14, 2006).  HOEPA contains a complex system of exclusions from “total 
points and fees.”  The exclusions include certain application fees, late charges, closing costs, security-
interest charges, and filing and recording fees.  National Consumer Law Center § 3.9 (1999). 
 
11  Federal Reserve System (2001), at 65,606–65,610. 
 
12 Loan flipping involves refinancing a residential mortgage with high fees in order to strip equity from a 
home, with little or no benefit to the borrower.  When loan flipping occurs, often it is instigated by the 
original lender, mortgage broker, or one of their affiliates. 
 
13 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.32, 226.34.  In general, holders of HOEPA loans "are subject to all claims and defenses 
. .  .  that could be raised against the original lender."  15 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(1). 
 
14 Demyanyk (2006) has surmised that states with comparatively high-income inequality are more likely to 
pass mini-HOEPA statutes.  According to her estimates, every 10 percent increase in income inequality in a 
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state in the current period made it 8 percent more likely that a state would adopt a predatory lending law in 
the next period.   
 When legislative campaigns stalled at the state level, some cities and counties passed anti-
predatory lending ordinances of their own.  These include Atlanta, Chicago, Cleveland, Cleveland Heights, 
Cook County (IL), Dayton, DeKalb County (IL), Detroit, Los Angeles, New York City, Oakland, 
Philadelphia, and Toledo.  All of these ordinances have been enjoined by court order, preempted by state 
legislation, or limited in coverage to lenders who contract with the cities.  In most cases, these ordinances 
never took effect or if they did take effect, they did so only briefly. 
 
15 Renuart & Keest (2005), §§ 3.10.1, 3.10.2 at n. 679; see infra note 23. 
 
16 12 C.F.R. § 560.2; Renuart & Keest (2005), § 3.5.3. 
 
17 69 Fed. Reg. 1904 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 34.3, 34.4).  In the years preceding this 
regulation, the O.C.C. issued several preemption rulings applying to discrete laws in individual states.  In 
the most famous of these rulings, issued in 2003, the O.C.C. preempted the Georgia Fair Lending Act.  
Renuart & Keest (2005), § 3.4.6.1. 
 
18 See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §7-6A-12; Johnson (1995). 
 
19 The article did not explain how subprime loans were defined.  The American Financial Services 
Association represents large subprime lenders.  At the time of the study, its members included Ameriquest 
Mortgage Company, Conseco Financial Corporation, Countrywide Home Loans, Equity One, CitiFinancial, 
Household Finance Corporation, Key Consumer Real Estate, Washington Mutual Finance, and Wells Fargo 
Financial, Inc. 
 
20 The study only compared subprime lending before and after the law’s enactment date, rather than before 
enactment and after the full effective date.  Although the authors conceded that that “window for detecting 
changes in lending patterns following passage of the North Carolina statute [was] narrow,” they argued that 
“creditors would not wait for the law to be fully effective to adjust their operations” because some parts of 
the law (including the ban on prepayment penalties) became effective in part on October 1, 1999 and even 
those provisions that did not go into effect until June 1, 2000 were known by July 1999, when the law was 
passed.  Id. at 422. 
 
21 From 1982 through year-end 2003, South Carolina banned prepayment penalties in most personal 
mortgages of up to $100,000.  Former S.C. Code Ann. § 37-10-103 (2001).  Another control state, Virginia, 
had a similar ban.  Starting in 1987 and continuing today, Virginia limited the size of prepayment penalties 
in junior lien residential mortgages.  The state later banned prepayment penalties altogether in refinancings 
of those mortgages by the same lender or an assignee.  Va. Stat. §§ 6.1-330.83 & 6.1-330.85 (2006).    
Meanwhile, Tennessee’s usury law required disclosure of certain prepayment penalties in residential 
mortgages as of January 1, 2001.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-108 (2006). 
 
 Until July 2003, the federal Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act (AMTPA) preempted 
state restrictions on prepayment penalty and balloon clauses for mortgages other than fixed-rate, fully 
amortizing mortgages made by “state housing creditors” (i.e., non-depository lenders).  AMTPA 
preemption applied in all states except six states that timely opted out of AMTPA’s coverage.  Renuart & 
Keest (2005), §§ 3.10.1, 3.10.2.  In July 2003, the U.S. Office of Thrift Supervision (2003) issued a ruling 
reversing federal preemption of state prepayment penalty laws under AMTPA.  The ruling thus revived 
state laws regulating prepayment penalties for non-depository finance companies.   
 
22 For comment on this study, see Center for Responsible Lending (2004). 
 
23 Scheessele (1999); HUD Subprime and Manufactured Home Lender List (2007).   
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24 Defined as a prepayment penalty of more than three years, a balloon payment, and/or a combined loan-
to-value ratio of 100 percent or more.  For debate of an earlier draft of this study, see U.S. Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (2003), Litan (2003) and Stegman, Quercia & Davis (2003). 
 
25 Quercia, Stegman & Davis (2004) at 596. 

26 The Philadelphia ordinance took effect on April 19, 2001.  Philadelphia Municipal Ordinance 00-715A 
(2000).  The Pennsylvania legislature preempted the city ordinance effective June 25, 2001.  63 Pa. Stat. 
456.504.   The study mistakenly used October 1, 2001 through March 31, 2002 as the period in which the 
Philadelphia was in effect.  By then, however, the law had already been overturned.   
 
27 Another report, by the Center for Statistical Research (2003), estimated that enactment of a law would 
cause subprime mortgage loans to decrease in New Jersey, based on data from North Carolina after passage 
of the North Carolina law.  The study used rudimentary methodology and studied a time-period that ended 
twenty months before the New Jersey law was passed. 
 
28 Morgan Stanley (2002) at 11. 
 
29 In Georgia (but not New Jersey), the reduction in overall subprime originations was attributable to a 
decline in loans with predatory features.  Li & Ernst (2006) at 13-14.   
 
30 Compared with the control states, nominal interest rates rose an average of 15.4 basis points on fixed-rate 
30-year subprime mortgages without prepayment penalties in Georgia and rose 17.3 basis points on average 
on adjustable-rate 2/28 hybrid mortgages without prepayment penalties in Virginia.  Id. at 16-17.  It is 
possible that the Georgia wild card statute (see note 19 supra) helps explain the Georgia results. 
 
31 The sample included border counties in ten states with anti-predatory lending laws – California, 
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas – 
and border counties in adjacent, unregulated states as controls.  Ho and Pennington-Cross (2006b) at 218. 
 
32 After doing our own legal research, we recalculated the 22 individual state rankings based on the 
coverage and restrictions indexes in this paper.  Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, , Maryland,  
Massachusetts, North Carolina, New Mexico, Okalahoma, South Carolina, and Utah had the strongest 
combined rankings for coverage and restrictions of the 22 states.  
 
33 Prior research has typically relied on summaries of state and local anti-predatory lending laws compiled 
by law firms and trade associations.   
 
34 Standard & Poor’s (2005). 
 
35 As of January 5th, 2007 the list was only available for 2004 HMDA.  This list is a lender list so loans 
identified as subprime are likely to also include some prime loans and loans identified as prime are likely to 
include some subprime loans. 
 
36 Therefore the average for IndexA is 3 by design, and the average for IndexM will deviate slightly 
depending on the distribution of scores.  In addition, relative to indexA, the standard deviation of the indexM 
will be larger. 
 
37 This is done because HMDA reports data annually with no other more detailed date information.  As a 
result, the 2004 sample will only include loans that were in effect before January 2004 and the 2005 sample 
will only include laws that were in effect before January 2005.   
 
38 State homestead exclusions are another legal consideration that could conceivably influence subprime 
market outcomes.  However, those exclusions do not generally apply to efforts of creditors to enforce 
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home-secured mortgages, either by their express terms or as interpreted by the courts.  Lloyd (1985).  
Consequently they are not included in this analysis. 
 
39 Elliehausen and Staten (2004, 2006), Harvey and Nigro (2003, 2004), Li and Ernst (2006) and Ho & 
Pennington-Cross (2006a, 2006b) all use borrower and location controls. 
 
40 The logit specification is given by   ii xx eeY  1)1Pr( , where Y is the outcome (application, 
origination, or rejection), x is a vector of explanatory variables as defined in the specification, and is a 
vector of parameters to be estimated. 
 
41 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (2004), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (2004). 
